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Introduction and summary
The Federal Reserve Act (as amended by the Full Em-
ployment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978) specifies
that the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System and the Federal Open Market Committee
should seek to promote effectively the goals of max-
imum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-
term interest rates (Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, 1994). Maximum employment facili-
tates the creation of national income and wealth. Low
and predictable rates of inflation help ensure that finan-
cial resources are allocated efficiently to their most
productive uses. When long-term interest rates are
moderate, the interests of borrowers and savers are
balanced to produce sustained high rates of capital
accumulation. With these broad objectives in mind,
the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) assesses
the state of the U.S. economy and charts a course for
monetary policy.
How are these monetary objectives translated
into month-to-month monetary policy decisions?
Perhaps the most accurate answer to this question is
contained in the minutes of the FOMC meetings, the
Federal Reserve Chairmans semi-annual testimony to
Congress as mandated by the HumphreyHawkins Act,
and numerous speeches by members of the FOMC
on an almost daily basis. The sheer volume of this
material is somewhat daunting, and a more casual
observer of economic events would almost surely
appreciate a simpler answer to this question.
This article explores two recent developments in
attempts to describe by simple means the response
of monetary policy to changing economic events.
The first development is the introduction in 1988 of
a futures market for the federal funds rate. Since 1982,
the primary instrument of monetary policy has been
the federal funds rate, either directly or indirectly.1
The futures market data provides a market expectation
for the future course of the fed funds rate. In principle,
the market participants have digested a large volume
of material related to the FOMCs expected future
actions, so the futures rate reflects this information.
Of course, moving the question from the FOMCs
deliberations to the futures markets inference about
FOMC actions is simply trading one black box expla-
nation for another.
The second development, however, holds poten-
tial for looking into this black box. In 1993, John Taylor
suggested a simple formula that he believes describes
how the Federal Open Market Committee has set the
federal funds rate since 1987.2 This formula has been
dubbed the Taylor rule, and its predictions matched
the 198792 path of the federal funds rate rather well.
The Taylor rule states that 1) the federal funds rate
should be increased/decreased whenever real gross
domestic product (GDP) is above/below its trend level,
and inflation has been above/below its desired level;
and 2) that equal weight should be given to output
and inflation gaps. Taylor finds that his rules predic-
tions are quite accurate. Consequently, the Taylor rule
approximately answers the question posed earlier
about month-to-month monetary policy decisions.
Further confirmation would follow if the Taylor rule
predictions roughly matched the predictions of the
federal funds futures market.
An important caveat, however, has been raised
by Orphanidess (1997) analysis of the Taylor rule in
practice. Taylor used final, revised data that were not
available to the FOMC at the time it set the federal
funds rate. Orphanides uses the actual data and fore-
casts from the FOMCs staff forecasts to construct
real-time predictions according to the Taylor rule; the
results are not as satisfactory as Taylors findings.45 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
In comparing the Taylor rule predictions with the fu-
tures market implications, it is important to use real-
time data since market participants made decisions
with the real-time data, not the final, revised data.3
Orphanidess analysis of the Taylor rule with
real-time data uses only data through 1992. The fact
that official Fed staff forecasts are only released with
a five-year delay limits his data availability. In my
analysis, I modify Taylors rule so that it can be
analyzed through 1997 using data on the unemploy-
ment rate and the Consumer Price Index (CPI).4 It
turns out that these data are real-time data. Specifi-
cally, while real GDP and the GDP deflator are revised
regularly, the unemployment rate and the CPI do not
get revised. Of course, additional assumptions must
be made in order to make the unemployment/CPI Tay-
lor rule comparable to Taylors original rule. These as-
sumptions are spelled out below.
The empirical evidence comparing the modified,
real-time Taylor rules with the futures market data is
mixed. The futures contract data do better than the
unemployment/CPI Taylor rules considered here. From
198997, the standard deviation of the three-month-
ahead futures forecast error is 28 basis points. The
Taylor rule forecasts considered in this article have
standard deviations that range from 100 basis points
to a low of 42 basis points. The unemployment/CPI
Taylor rules do not account for the large increases in
the funds rate in 1989 and the relatively low funds
rates in 199394. The futures market participants per-
formed substantially better during these periods.5
Nevertheless, although the best Taylor rule forecast
has a standard deviation 50 percent higher than the
futures data, the overall fit appears good enough to
justify its use as a rough description of monetary
policy actions for the purposes of evaluating alterna-
tive econometric models of the monetary policy
transmission mechanism.
Fed funds futures as forecasts of future
monetary policy shifts
Since the federal funds rate has been the primary
instrument of monetary policy since 1982, I use the
federal funds futures data to produce a market expec-
tation for the future path of the federal funds rate. This
futures market allows market participants to hedge
their exposure to a certain type of interest rate risk. For
example, consider a bank that anticipates the need to
borrow $100 million in the interbank market for a num-
ber of weeks. Suppose the current federal funds rate
is 4 percent and the bank is concerned that the rate
may increase to 5 percent during this period. If the
bank is fairly certain about the likelihood of this higher
funds rate path, it may be willing to lock in a 4.5 per-
cent interest rate over the next month. If other provid-
ers of federal funds expect the funds rate to remain
unchanged at 4 percent, they may be willing to guar-
antee a future interest rate of 4.5 percent over the
next month. Consequently, there is an opportunity to
pool these interest rate risks by using the futures mar-
ket. Krueger and Kuttner (1996) found that the federal
funds futures market is efficient: that is, the futures
data provide predictions on the future path of the
federal funds rate that cannot be improved upon by
considering other financial or macroeconomic data
available to market participants at the time.6
Figure 1 displays the federal funds rate forecast
implied by the one-month-ahead and three-month-
ahead futures contracts, as well as the actual funds
rate. On the whole, the futures data track the funds
rate fairly well. However, movements in the actual
funds rate often precede the expected movement from
the futures rate data. For example, in October 1990,
the funds rate was 7.75 percent and in June 1991 it
was 5.75 percent. Both the one-month and three-month
futures contracts were surprised by this rapid reduc-
tion in the funds rate. For each contract, the futures
data implied a greater likelihood that the current funds
rate (at that time) would be maintained. As the funds
rate was reduced during this period, the futures mar-
ket gradually ratcheted down its own expectation.
Panel C displays the actual forecast error: that is,
the difference between the futures rate forecast of the
federal funds rate and the actual funds rate. Three ob-
servations are noteworthy. First, the forecast errors
are larger for the three-month-ahead contract. This
is not surprising. Movements in the funds rate are
extremely persistent, with the funds rate not chang-
ing for long periods of time. Consequently, when eco-
nomic developments change sufficiently to warrant a
movement in the funds rate, the longer forecast hori-
zon implies more uncertainty about how interest rates
will move. Second, there are typically large prediction
errors around the time that the funds rate path chang-
es its tilt; examples of these large errors occur in late
1990, late 1992, early 1994, and early 1995. A closely
related point is that negative forecast errors tend to
be associated with a declining federal funds path, and
positive errors with a rising federal funds path. Finally,
from 1989 through 1997, the standard deviation of the
forecast errors was 14 basis points and 32 basis points
for the one-month and three-month-ahead contracts,
respectively.
Since the federal funds futures market is effi-
cient, market participants are using all available and
useful information in forecasting the future path of46 Economic Perspectives
the federal funds rate. As Rudebusch (1997) has
pointed out, these market forecasts are completely
flexible in their ability to incorporate new information,
unlike more rigid highly parameterized and stylized
statistical models. Consequently, to the extent that
the futures market is efficient, the standard deviation
of 32 basis points for the three-month-ahead forecast
error can be thought of as a lower limit on the ability
of statistical models to forecast future changes in the
federal funds rate for the next quarter.
Taylor’s rule for monetary policy
In an influential article, Taylor (1993) summarized
recent evidence on how industrialized economies
were likely to perform when the monetary authority
followed simple rules in setting short-term interest
rates. In econometric simulations, the variability of
real GDP growth and inflation was relatively low when
a monetary authority increased short-term nominal
interest rates in response to strong GDP growth or
rising inflation. Taylor then asked, could the behavior
of the Federal Open Market Committee during Alan
Greenspans tenure as chairman be described in terms
of  a simple rule? Interestingly, Taylors answer was yes.
Taylor specified the following rule for the setting
of the federal funds:
1) FFt = rt + pt + 1 
2 (yt  yt
*) + 1 
2 ( pt   p*),
where FF is the federal funds rate, r is the real inter-
est rate, p is the average inflation rate over the prior
four quarters,  p* is the target inflation rate, y is real
GDP, and y* is trend real GDP. This policy rule instructs
the monetary authority to raise the federal funds rate
by one-half of the output gap (yt   yt
*) and one-half
of the inflation gap ( pt  p*).
Taylors discussion indicates that the numerical
parameters were selected primarily for illustrative pur-
poses. The real interest rate and inflation target are
both assumed to be 2 percent, and the weights on
output and inflation are each ½. However, as figure 2
indicates, the implied path for the federal funds rate
during the Greenspan era (at the time of Taylors writ-
ing in 1992 and early 1993) matched the actual path
quite well.7 Reconstructing Taylors analysis is diffi-
cult since the data he used have been revised sub-
stantially. Nevertheless, the data in figure 2 are from
National Income and Product Account releases
around the time of Taylors 199293 analysis. Panel A
displays the deviation of real GDP from Taylors trend
path estimated over the time period 198492. Panel B
is the four-quarter average growth rate of the implicit
GDP deflator. Panel C displays the implied path for
the federal funds rate versus the actual funds rate.
The Taylor rule picks out the general rise in the inter-
est rate from 1987 through early 1989 and then the re-
versal through 1992. It is particularly interesting that
the Taylor rule includes no references to the past his-
tory of the federal funds rate. This path of the funds
rate emerges solely from macroeconomic fundamental
variables, not simply the past history of the federal
funds rate.8
FIGURE 1
Futures forecasts of the federal funds rate
percentage rate, annual
A. Federal funds rate and one-month-ahead futures rate
percentage rate, annual
B. Federal funds rate and three-month-ahead futures rate
percentage rate, annual
C. Forecast errors from futures data
Notes: The daily futures rates are averaged over the
month to construct the monthly data observations. The
one-month-ahead futures rate for January 1990 is the
implied federal funds rate composed from the December
one-month-ahead futures contract data. Similarly, the
three-month-ahead futures rate for January 1990 is
computed from October 1989 data.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
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Figure 3 displays the differences between the
actual federal funds rate and the implied funds rates
from my recreation of the original Taylor rule, the
one-month and three-month-ahead futures rate data.9
The Taylor errors cover his original sample period of
198792, while the futures errors begin in 1989, soon
after the futures market began. Over the common
sample period of 1989:Q2 through 1992:Q3, the stan-
dard deviations of the Taylor and three-month-ahead
futures errors were 31 basis points and 34 basis points,
respectively. In other words, the Taylor rule did slightly
better than the federal funds futures. The patterns
indicate that both forecasts were surprised by the
rapidness of the policy easing in early 1991. Other
surprises tended to be more idiosyncratic. The Taylor
rule overpredicted the funds rate in late 1990 when the
futures market did not. The futures market was sur-
prised by the rate reductions in late 1991 when the
Taylor rule was not. On balance, for this small number
of observations, these two simple methods of predict-
ing monetary policy performed similarly.
At first glance, the excellent performance of the
Taylor rule seems amazing. After all, this policy rule
does not peek at the actual level of the funds rate at
FIGURE 2
The Taylor rule and its components
percent deviation, annual
A. Deviation of real GDP from trend GDP
percentage rate, annual
B. Inflation during the previous 4 quarters (GDP deflator)
percentage rate, annual
C. Federal funds rate and the Taylor rule
Source: Author’s calculations based upon data from the
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic






The Taylor rule and the futures market
percentage rate, annual
A. The Taylor rule and the one-month-ahead futures rate
percentage rate, annual
B. The Taylor rule and three-month-ahead futures rate
percent deviation, annual
C. Forecast errors from the Taylor rule and futures data
Notes: The daily futures rates are averaged over the
month to construct the monthly data observations. The
one-month-ahead futures rate for January 1990 is the
implied federal funds rate composed from the December
one-month-ahead futures contract data. Similarly, the
three-month-ahead futures rate for January 1990 is
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any time. Furthermore, the Taylor rule performed bet-
ter than the futures market. Although the discrepancy
is small, it is slightly surprising that the futures market
forecast errors tended to be slightly larger over this
small number of observations. However, the Taylor
rule has at least one advantage over the futures market
participants, and possibly two.10
First, the Taylor rule uses a measure of the out-
put gap which is computed from a regression of the
logarithm of real GDP on a linear trend over the sam-
ple period 198492. Simply put, this estimate uses in-
formation about future movements in real GDP which
the futures market and other interested parties did
not have. Second, the real GDP data which Taylor
used in his study had been revised from the initial
data releases that futures market participants and
monetary policymakers had access to. Its unclear
how or if this later data helps to better identify the
policy decisions of the FOMC, but it is a source of
difference between the Taylor rule and the information
available to futures market participants at the time of
the futures contracts. If we implement a Taylor rule
but restrict the data inputs to information actually
available, would we continue to see the excellent
performance of the Taylor approach?
Simple policy rules and real-time data
Orphanides (1997) has investigated the robust-
ness of Taylors original fed funds projections from
1987 to 1992. Specifically, Orphanides points out that
the FOMC and market participants did not have the
final revised GDP and implicit GDP deflator data that
Taylor used (as displayed in figure 2). Instead,
Orphanides uses the actual GDP and deflator data that
the Board of Governors staff presented to the FOMC
at the time of their meetings during this period.11 To
compute the output gap, he uses an estimate of poten-
tial output, constructed by Board staff, at the time of
the meeting. In this way, there is no possibility that
data unavailable to the FOMC are contaminating the
projected path of the federal funds rate using the sim-
ple rule for monetary policy.
Orphanides finds a very different picture than
the one contained in figure 2. The real-time data do
imply a general increase in interest rates from 1987
through 1988 and then a decline into 1992. But the
implied level of the federal funds rate in early 1987 is
200 basis points lower than Taylors calculation; and
often the discrepancy is as large as 100 basis points.
There is also a period from mid-1989 through mid-1990
when the real-time data indicate a rising funds rate,
but the actual funds rate was falling. As Orphanides
discusses, the real-time data from 1987 through 1990
suggested smaller output and inflation gaps than
Taylors data; this implied substantially lower projec-
tions of the funds rate using the Taylor rule. This anal-
ysis implies that the federal funds futures market
projections were in fact much more accurate than a real-
time Taylor rule using real GDP and GDP deflator
data. Orphanides analysis highlights an important
example in which data revisions play a potentially
important role in the monetary policy review process.
There are two other examples from this period
that emerge from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) employment report. The first example centers
on the reduction in the federal funds rate from 3.25
percent to 3 percent on September 4, 1992. Unbe-
knownst to participants at the time, this was the final
interest rate cut following the initial reduction from
9.75 percent in 1989. On September 4, the BLS released
the August employment report. According to reports
in the New York Times and Wall Street Journal, mar-
ket analysts expected the August employment report
to overstate true employment growth by 100,000 to
150,000 jobs.12 The explanation involved a seasonal
adjustment factor that did not accurately account for
an unusual season of summer jobs programs in 1992.
The initial data release at 8:30 a.m. EDT indicated reduc-
tions in total establishment payrolls of 83,000 jobs
and 167,000 private jobs. These numbers were inter-
preted as overestimates of true employment chang-
es.13 At 9:00 a.m. EDT, the target federal funds rate
was reduced by 25 basis points to 3 percent.
One interpretation of this policy move is that the
normal response of monetary policy to a sharp, unex-
pected reduction in employment at this juncture was
to ease monetary policy. In other words, analysts at
the time probably did not interpret this as an exoge-
nous monetary policy shock to the economy. By the
time this article was prepared in 1998, however, the
August 1992 employment data had been revised to
reflect an increase in total establishment payrolls of
129,000 jobs. In other words, the data revisions sug-
gest that the economy was growing more strongly
than market analysts and the FOMC anticipated at
the time of the 25 basis point cut in the federal funds
rate on September 4, 1992. If the prior easing was
thought to be a normal response to an employment
reduction of 167,000 (less another 100,000), then it
most likely looks now to be an exogenous policy eas-
ing relative to employment growth of 129,000. This
example shows how data revisions can alter every-
ones perspective on the state of the economy after
the fact, and possibly even the rationale for a change
in interest rates.49 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
The second example can be found in the two
years following the 199091 recession, when employ-
ment grew slowly. However, part of this perception
has been altered by data revisions. During this period,
a common benchmark comparison was to relate the
current level of employment to the previous business
cycle peak level of employment in July 1990. Panel A
of figure 4 shows that as of March 1993, payroll employ-
ment had only closed 48 percent of the gap between the
peak and trough levels of employment. In June 1993,
the BLS announced its annual benchmark revisions.
Panel A also displays the revised data as of June 1993.
The revisions reduced the peak level of employment
in 1990 and increased the growth in payrolls from June
1992 through 1993. Suddenly, with the data revisions,
the March 1993 employment gap was 80 percent
closed and completely closed with the June 1993
increase in employment.
Panel B of Figure 4 displays an alternative measure
of employment, constructed from surveys of house-
holds which are used in constructing the unemploy-
ment rate. Month-to-month movements in these data
are more variable than the corresponding payroll em-
ployment data. However, this measure of employment
does not get revised. For the 199193 period, the
household survey more quickly made apparent the
fact that employment regained its prior business cycle
peak by early 1993. Even though the month-to-month
movements in the household survey measure of em-
ployment are quite volatile, longer horizon movements
seem to provide useful corroborating information
about the state of the economy. Consequently, the
household survey of employment and the unemploy-
ment rate are plausible alternative sources of data on
economic activity that are not subject to data revisions.
Taylor-type rule using unemployment
and CPI data
The previous discussion has highlighted the dif-
ficulties that real-time data considerations pose for
implementing monetary policy. Specifically, any poli-
cy that relies on data that are ultimately revised can
yield conflicting policy recommendations over time.
However, policy rules that are based on data that do
not get revised will not suffer from this. Of course,
this data must be sufficiently informative about the
state of the economy to be used in place of real GDP
and the implicit GDP deflator. Another way to com-
pute a Taylor-type monetary policy rule is to use the
unemployment rate and the CPI. Clearly these data
are relevant to the setting of monetary policy: In their
semi-annual report to Congress, the FOMC presents
forecasts of the unemployment rate and the CPI infla-
tion rate. These data do not get revised, except for
their seasonal factors which presumably do not play
a large role in the discussion. Since food and energy
inflation rates tend to be more volatile and transitory
than other components of the CPI, many business
analysts and policymakers exclude food and energy
from their CPI analyses as a better indicator of under-
lying inflationary pressures than the total CPI. Here-
after, this will be referred to as the core CPI.
Just as Taylors rule required additional assump-
tions, implementing an unemployment/CPI Taylor rule
requires additional judgment. Specifically, I consider
the following rule:
2) FFt = rt + pt + 1 
2
* okun* (ut
* - ut) + 1 
2
* ( pt   pt
*),
where ut is the unemployment rate, ut
* is the natural
rate of unemployment, and okun is a parameter that
refers to Okuns law. As in equation 1, the target infla-
tion rate and the real interest rate are each assumed
to be 2 percent.14 Two new conceptual issues are
introduced in this formulation of a Taylor rule. First,
the natural rate is that value of the unemployment




A. Establishment survey: Total employment
thousands of employees
B. Household survey: Total employment
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, “Employment report,” March and June 1993 for




in the inflation rate. In Taylors rule, the strength of
economic activity is measured by the percentage
points that real GDP is above its trend path. In the
rule considered here, it is measured by the percent-
age points that the unemployment rate is below its
natural rate of unemployment. Just as trend GDP is
not observed or reported by a government agency,
neither is the natural rate; some estimate is neces-
sary. The time subscript allows for the possibility
that the natural rate varies over time. The second new
concept is Okuns law which describes the relation-
ship between output gaps and unemployment gaps.
In 1962, Arthur Okun observed that a 1 percent fall in
the unemployment rate from its full employment level
tended to produce a 3 percent increase in real GDP
relative to trend. There is substantial uncertainty as
to the precise value for Okuns law. For example, Hall
and Taylor (1988) cite 3 percent as the value of Okuns
law, while Mankiw (1994) uses 2 percent. In any event,
for the remainder of this article, I will assume the Okuns
law coefficient to be 3.
The most controversial aspect of this rule is the
selection of the natural rate of unemployment. Until
recently, many economists argued forcefully that the
natural rate of unemployment was 6 percent (Gordon,
1997). However, in recent years, the unemployment
rate has fallen below 6 percent and inflation has con-
tinued to fall. Possible inferences are 1) the theory
is wrong and there is no relationship between unem-
ployment and inflation; 2) the natural rate of unem-
ployment varies over time and has fallen well below
6 percent currently; 3) the natural rate was always be-
low 6 percent but economists inference about its value
has been wrong until lately; 4) the theory is right with
6 percent, but our measures of inflation do not proper-
ly reflect true inflationary pressures; or 5) something
else is afoot. Next, I consider several alternatives.
Time-invariant natural rates
Figure 5 displays two implementations of the
unemployment/CPI Taylor rule. The natural rate is
assumed to be 6 percent in one case, and 6.5 percent
in the other. There is some evidence that the natural
rate was as high as 6.5 percent in 1987, which is when
my analysis of the unemployment/CPI Taylor rule
begins (Braun, 1990). Since both rules assume that
the target inflation rate is 2 percent, the only differ-




The Taylor rule with a time invariant natural rate
A. Core inflation during previous four quarters
percentage rate, annual
B. Unemployment and the constant natural rate
percentage rate, annual
C. Taylor rule with 6 percent natural rate
percentage rate, annual
D. Taylor rule with 6.5 percent natural rate
Core inflation
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Assuming the natural rate to be 6.5 percent results
in a higher projected path than when 6 percent is as-
sumed. For example, the 6 percent rule implies that
the unemployment rate was below the natural rate
from late 1987 through late 1990 and thus contributed
to a higher than otherwise funds rate. However, the
6.5 percent rule implied a still more contractionary
policy setting during all of 1987 and into early 1991.
Nevertheless, neither rule can account for the large
run-up in the funds rate in 1989. Similarly, Orphanidess
analysis of the Taylor rule with real-time GDP data
could not account for the 1989 episode. Apparently
the initial GDP releases and the unemployment data
painted a similar picture of the economy. According to
this analysis using real-time data, the 1989 funds rate
was surprisingly high given the data at the time.
Recalling that Taylors original implementation large-
ly accounted for the 1989 period, that success was an
apparently fortuitous outcome due to either 1) subse-
quent data revisions unknown at the time of the mone-
tary policy deliberations or 2) the fact that Taylors esti-
mate of trend GDP assumed knowledge of future GDP.
Figure 5 also shows the 6.5 percent rule matches
well the reduction in the funds rate from late 1990
through mid-1992, while the 6 percent rule better
matches the bottoming out of the funds rate in 1993.
As the unemployment rate remained relatively steady
in 1995, the 6.5 percent rule better captured the level
of the funds rate.
Although these rules do capture some of the
broad movements in the funds rate path over this
period, the prediction errors are sizable. Another un-
settling fact is that neither of these rules dominates
the other. The assumption of a constant natural rate
of unemployment may be the source of this conflict.
Time-varying natural rates of unemployment
An alternative is to allow the natural rate of unem-
ployment to vary over time. King, Stock, and Watson
(1995) study the relationship between inflation and
the unemployment rate. They specify an econometric
model that can be used to estimate a time-varying
NAIRUthat value of the unemployment rate, which
if maintained, would forecast no long-run change in
the inflation rate. Their statistical model assumes that
inflation evolves depending upon its own past history
and the history of the unemployment gap. They model
the natural rate as an unobserved random walk. I esti-
mated their model over the sample period 197086 us-
ing the Kalman Filter methods they employed.15
Figure 6 displays the unemployment rate and
two measures of the time-varying NAIRU for the period
198797, using the estimated coefficients from the
197086 sample period. The first measure comes from
the Kalman filter, and is a real-time measure (NAIRU-KF).
For example, the NAIRU-KF estimate in July 1987 is a
function of the data known at that date in 1987 and
no future data. The second measure comes from the
Kalman smoother (NAIRU-KS). The measure NAIRU-
KS provides a statistically more accurate assessment
of the NAIRU, but it is constructed using all of the
data through 1997. This means that the 1987 estimate
is a function of 1997 data, and so could not have been
known in real time. The NAIRU-KS estimates have
the flavor of historical data that are continually revised
as new data are released. In this sense, the analysis
using NAIRU-KS is similar to Taylors analysis using
historically revised GDP data. Notice that the real-
time NAIRU is above the smoothed NAIRU; conse-
quently, the real-time assessment of the inflation-
unemployment data suggests more inflationary pres-
sures over the 198797 period than the full-sample
Kalman smoother estimate. In the unemployment/CPI
Taylor rule, this means that the funds rate path will
be higher using the real-time NAIRU estimates.
Figure 6 displays six alternative settings of the
unemployment/CPI Taylor rule. Panels C and D of fig-
ure 6 use the NAIRU-KS measure for the unemploy-
ment gap, while panels E and F use the real-time NAI-
RU-KF measure. In panels C and E, the black line is
the rule referred to in equation 2, while the colored
line is a forward-looking measure. In this latter case,
the inflation gap is measured as the difference between
the forecasted average inflation rate over the next 12
months minus the inflation target. The inflation fore-
cast is computed using KingStockWatsons infla-
tion model. Panels D and F contain an adaptive rule:
Inflationary expectations in the inflation gap are taken
to be a simple average of the backward-looking and
forward-looking inflation measures. Inflationary expec-
tations of this form have been suggested by Fuhrer
and Moore (1995) and Roberts (1998). The adaptive rule
is neither well-grounded in economic theory nor an
optimal forecast of inflation based upon any particu-
lar statistical model. However, the adaptive rule does
impart an additional degree of inertia into inflationary
expectations beyond the forward-looking measure.
Many business and economic forecasters who use
judgmental forecasting methods employ expectations
mechanisms like this one. See Roberts (1998) for a
discussion of this point.
In figure 6, the unemployment/CPI Taylor rules
that use the Kalman smoother NAIRU generate a
funds rate forecast that is almost always below the
actual federal funds rate. As I discussed above, this
is related to the fact that the NAIRU-KS is below the
real-time NAIRU-KF over the sample period 198797.52 Economic Perspectives
The real-time Taylor rules in figure 6 better match the
level of the funds rate from 1987 to 1992, except for
the much higher rates in late 198889. From 1992 to
1997, the forward-looking, real-time path is higher
than the backward-looking measures and also higher
than the actual funds rate path. From late 1994 to
1997, the actual funds rate is between the forward- and
backward-looking rules; consequently, the adaptive
rule matches the level of the funds rate rather well
during this period.
Relative to the time-invariant NAIRU rules, the
time-varying rules seem to capture more of the funds
rate movement over this period. However, even the
best match (adaptive NAIRU-KF in panel F) has sub-
stantial forecast errors in 198889 and 199294. Before
comparing these rules to the futures market forecasts,
one more rule will be considered.
Partial adjustment rules
The Taylor-type rules that I have considered so
far make no reference to the past history of interest
rates. However, the futures market clearly uses that
information. Additionally, economists often simply
assume that an objective of central bankers is to
smooth interest rate fluctuations over short periods
of time (see Goodfriend, 1991). So it is of some inter-
est to consider how a partial adjustment Taylor rule
would have performed over this sample period.16 The
partial adjustment rule is
FIGURE 6
percentage rate, annual
The Taylor rule with a time varying natural rate
A. Core inflation during previous four quarters
percentage rate, annual
B. Unemployment and time-varying NAIRU
percentage rate, annual
C. Taylor rule with Kalman smoother natural rate
percentage rate, annual















E. Taylor rule with Kalman filter natural rate
percentage rate, annual
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where l is a coefficient between zero and one. Sup-
pose that l is 1 
2. This rule says that the funds rate
should be set equal to its value last period plus an
amount that moves the funds rate halfway toward its
desired value according to the unemployment/CPI
Taylor rule specified in equation 2. Panel A of figure 7
displays the adaptive Taylor rule and the partial adjust-
ment rule that is computed with l equal to 1 
2. The big-
gest difference in the rules is during the period mid-
1992 through 1994. This is the period when the adap-
FIGURE 7
A revised look at the Taylor rule
and the futures market
percentage rate, annual
A. Adaptive and partial adjustment rules
percentage rate, annual
B. Adaptive rule and the three-month-ahead futures rates
percentage rate, annual




















tive rule misses the roughly 18-month period when
the federal funds rate was near 3 percent. Predictably,
the partial adjustment rule essentially splits the differ-
ence between the two. Similarly, in 1989 when the
funds rate was surprisingly high relative to the pre-
dicted path of the unemployment/CPI Taylor rule, the
partial adjustment rule is closer to the actual funds
rate path.
Panel B of figure 7 displays the three-month-ahead
futures rate and the partial adjustment unemployment/
CPI Taylor rule against the actual federal funds rate.
Recall that futures data only begin in 1989. The futures
data track the path of the federal funds rate more closely
than the Taylor rule. As panel C shows, the forecast
errors are much larger for the adaptive Taylor rule. From
1989 to 1997, the standard deviation of the futures fore-
cast error is 28 basis points. The adaptive Taylor rule
has a standard deviation of 74 basis points over the
same period. The partial adjustment rule represents a
substantial improvement toward the futures market
data; the standard deviation is only 42 basis points.
Although the partial adjustment rule has a stan-
dard deviation 50 percent higher than the futures data,
the broad contours of the implied funds rate path
seem to track the actual fund rate data reasonably
well. Perhaps this justifies the adaptive, partial adjust-
ment unemployment/CPI Taylor rules use as a rough
description of monetary policy actions for the purposes
of evaluating alternative econometric models of the
monetary transmission mechanism. For the most part,
this policy rule seems like a plausible approximation
of the path of the federal funds rate over the period
1987 through 1997. The rule captures three objectives
that are often attributed to central banks: inflation
fighting, countercyclical stabilization, and interest
rate smoothing.
Conclusion
How are monetary objectives translated into
month-to-month monetary policy decisions? John
Taylor (1993) argued that monetary policy from 1987
to 1992 followed a simple, rule-like behavior. This
article has evaluated the ability of several alternative
Taylor rules to match the federal funds futures fore-
casts of the funds rate using data that was available
to all participants at the time. The article confirms
research findings by Orphanides (1997) that data
revisions played an important role in Taylors original
finding that his rule matched the path of the funds
rate over this period. Using the unemployment rate
and core CPI, I have found that some versions of a
Taylor rule roughly match the broad movements of54 Economic Perspectives
REFERENCES
NOTES
1See Bernanke and Mihov (1996) for a discussion of the empir-
ical relevance of this assertion.
2An alternative formulation of monetary policy rules in prac-
tice is to use vector autoregression  (VAR) models. Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1998) provides a survey of this
literature.
3Rudebusch (1997) has also criticized statistical analyses of
monetary policy reaction functions which used revised data
that were unavailable to policymakers at the time of their
decisions.
4Orphanides (1997) discusses this alternative policy rule in gen-
eral terms, but leaves it for others to consider in more depth.
5Similarly, Rudebusch (1997) points out that VAR policy rules
performed poorly relative to the futures market.
6Evans and Kuttner (1998) discuss how small deviations from
market efficiency can influence statistical analyses with futures
data.
7The conference was held in November 1992, and the confer-
ence volume was published in late 1993.
8As an analogy, imagine being instructed to drive from down-
town Chicago to Washington, DC. The policy rule is analogous
to the written instructions detailing the highways and exits you
are to take. Imagine how much more difficult the journey
would be if you were not allowed to periodically check the
highway signs along the side of the road to make sure that you
hadnt taken a wrong turn.
9My implementation of the Taylor rule here provides its fore-
cast with a slight data advantage over the futures data. The
advantage lies solely in the output gap measure: It is the con-
temporaneous deviation of real GDP from trend, although real
GDP is actually reported with a lag. The treatment of inflation
does not provide an advantage, since it is the average inflation
rate from the prior four quarters.
10See Orphanides (1997) for an extended discussion of this
critique.
11The data and projections came from the Boards green book
analysis. These data are available to the public five years later.
Consequently, Orphanidess analysis can only extend through
1992.
12Vogel and Boucek (1992); and Fuerbringer (1992a).
13Harper (1992); and Fuerbringer (1992b).
14Since the average CPI inflation rate has been higher than
the GDP deflator used in equation 1 over the sample period,
a slightly higher p* might be appropriate for equation 2. The
contours of the analysis that follows, however, are essentially
unchanged.
15I assumed that the standard deviation of the shock to the
natural rate of unemployment was 0.1. This is near the middle
range of the values considered by King, Stock, and Watson
(1995). For more details, see their description of the model.
16Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1997) consider partial adjustment
Taylor rules and find they fit the U.S. experience well over the
period 197994.
the funds rate from 1987 to 1997. These Taylor rule
forecasts, however, have a standard deviation 50 per-
cent larger than the implied forecasts from the federal
Bernanke, B., and I. Mihov, 1996, Measuring mone-
tary policy, Princeton University, unpublished
manuscript.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
1994, Goals of monetary policy, Federal Reserve
System Purposes and Functions, available on the
Internet at www.bog.frb.fed.us/pf/pdf/frspurp.pdf,
p. 17.
Braun, S., 1990, Estimation of current quarter gross
national product by pooling preliminary labor-market
data, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics,
Vol. 8, July, pp. 293304.
Christiano, L., M. Eichenbaum, and C. Evans, 1998,
Monetary policy shocks: What have we learned and
to what end?, in Handbook of Monetary Econom-
ics, Michael Woodford and John Taylor (eds.), forth-
coming.
Clarida, R., J. Gali, and M. Gertler, 1997, Monetary
policy rules in practice: Some international evidence,
National Bureau of Economic Research, working
paper, No. 6254.
Evans, C., and K. Kuttner, 1998, Can VARs describe
monetary policy?, Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, unpublished manuscript, April.
funds futures market contracts. Perhaps this is close
enough to justify using Taylor-type policy rules in
evaluating econometric models of industrial econo-
mies. But more research on this question is needed.55 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Fuerbringer, Jonathon, 1992a, Credit markets: Some
silver linings for the dollar, New York Times, Septem-
ber 1, Financial Desk, Section D, p. 13.
                    , 1992b, Bonds surge on poor jobs re-
port, New York Times, September 5, Financial Desk,
Section 1, p. 31.
Fuhrer, J., and G. Moore, 1995, Inflation persistence,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 110, No. 1, Feb-
ruary, pp. 127159.
Goodfriend, M., 1991, Interest rate policy and the
conduct of monetary policy, in Carnegie-Rochester
Conference Series on Public Policy, Vol. 34, Amster-
dam: North-Holland, pp. 730.
Gordon, R., 1997, The time-varying NAIRU and
its implications for economic policy, Journal of
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 11, pp. 1132.
Hall, R., and J. Taylor, 1988, Macroeconomics, second
edition, New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
Harper, Lucinda, 1992, Jobs picture remained bleak
during August; Unemployment rate eased but num-
ber of workers on payrolls plummeted, Wall Street
Journal, September 8, p. A2.
King, R., J. Stock, and M. Watson, 1995, Temporal
instability of the unemploymentinflation relation-
ship, Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank
of Chicago, Vol. 14, May/June, pp. 212.
Krueger, J., and K. Kuttner, 1996, The fed funds
futures rate as a predictor of Federal Reserve policy,
Journal of Futures Markets, Vol. 16, pp. 865879.
Mankiw, G., 1994, Macroeconomics, second edition.
New York: Worth Publishers, Inc.
Orphanides, Athanasios, 1997, Monetary policy
rules based on real-time data, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, Finance and Economics
Discussion Series, No. 1998-03, December.
Roberts, J., 1998, Inflation expectations and the trans-
mission of monetary policy, unpublished manuscript.
Rudebusch, Glenn, 1997, Do measures of monetary
policy in a VAR make sense?, unpublished manuscript.
Taylor, John, 1993, Discretion versus policy rules in
practice, in Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series
on Public Policy, Vol. 39, pp. 195214.
Vogel, Jr., Thomas T., and Jan Boucek, 1992, Credit
markets: Bond prices end tightly mixed in light trading
with investors awaiting todays U.S. job report, Wall
Street Journal, September 4, p. C15.